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FORECLOSURE By PRIVATE TRUSTEE: Now Is
THE TIME FOR COLORADO
By ANDREA BLOOM*
INTRODUCTION
Two methods of enforcing payment of a debt secured by a mort-
gage through the sale of the mortgaged property, otherwise known as
mortgage foreclosure, predominate in the United States today. Judicial
foreclosure is available in every state.' Where a deed of trust or mort-
gage with a power of sale is used, thirty-three states and the District of
Columbia recognize the method of nonjudicial foreclosure by the mort-
gagee or trustee.
2
Colorado's nonjudicial foreclosure procedure is unique in that a
public official conducts the entire process.3 All other states that recog-
nize nonjudicial foreclosure allow a private trustee or the mortgagee to
exercise the power of sale. For a Colorado mortgagee to take advantage
of the relatively simple statutory method to foreclose deeds of trust,4 the
deed of trust must name as the trustee the public trustee of the county in
which the mortgaged property is located. 5 A deed of trust that names
any other person as trustee is deemed to be a mortgage and may be
foreclosed only through the courts. 6 Colorado is the only state that has
adopted a public trustee system for nonjudicial foreclosures.
* B.A., University of Michigan; J.D., University of Colorado. The author is pres-
ently in private practice in Denver, Colorado.
1. G. NELSON, & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 7.11 (2d ed. 1985) [here-
inafter NELSON & WHITMAN]. The method of judicial foreclosure requires a full judicial
proceeding to determine the existence and extent of the lien and the supervision of the
court in the sale of the mortgaged property. Judicial foreclosure is complex, expensive,
and time-consuming. See Cost and Time Factors in Foreclosure of Mortgages, 3 REAL PROPPROB.
& TR.J. 413 (1968). Judicial foreclosure of all mortgage instruments is available in Colo-
rado pursuant to COLO. R. Civ. P. 105.
2. These states are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Ore-
gon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washing-
ton, West Virginia, and Wyoming. A power of sale clause in a mortgage or deed of trust
gives the mortgagee or trustee the right and power on default (i) to advertise and sell the
property at a public auction, usually without resort to a court for authority, (ii) to satisfy
the debt to the mortgagee out of the sale proceeds, and (iii) to convey the property by
deed to the purchaser at the foreclosure sale. Each state's statutes and the terms of the
power of sale clause govern the type and degree of notice given and the manner of the
sale. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 1, at § 7.19. Power of sale foreclosure is generally
more efficient and less costly than judicial foreclosure. Id.
3. The establishment of the public trustee system and the procedures that public
trustees must follow for conducting a foreclosure are set forth in COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-
37-101 to 144, 38-38-101 to 110, 38-39-101 to 119 (1973 & Supp. 1987).
4. Id.
5. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-101 (1973).
6. Id.
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A dramatic increase in the number of foreclosures in 1986 and 1987
in Colorado, due to a downturn in the economy, emphasized one weak-
ness in Colorado's public trustee system: the inability of public trustees
to deal in a timely manner with large numbers of foreclosures. 7 In
search of a remedy for the public trustees' delays in the commencement
of foreclosure proceedings, the lending community urged the Colorado
legislature to pass a bill permitting private trustees to perform the same
functions as public trustees in power of sale foreclosures. Such a bill
was introduced in the 1987 session of the Colorado General Assembly.
8
A committee amendment deleted the bill's provision for private trust-
ees9 due to the legislators' reluctance to proceed without sufficient in-
formation regarding the implications and wisdom of adopting a private
trustee system.' 0 This article considers the issues involved in a private
trustee system with the intent to fill the gap left at the end of the 1987
legislative session.
Private trustees should be permitted to conduct nonjudicial power
of sale foreclosures in Colorado, provided that the extent and manner of
notices and the judicial hearing for an order authorizing the sale are
retained as integral parts of the foreclosure process. The potential im-
provements to the system resulting from the use of private trustees out-
weigh any perceived advantages in the current public trustee process.
With minimal statutory modifications, a private trustee system can be
implemented to provide a more efficient system for Colorado." I
This study begins with a discussion of Colorado's nonjudicial fore-
closure procedures conducted by the public trustee. The article then
explores the historical and legislative background for the original adop-
tion of the public trustee system in 1894. Next, the beneficial effects of
competition among many private trustees upon the power of sale fore-
closure process are addressed, along with suggested statutory modifica-
tions to the foreclosure scheme to ensure that a private trustee system is
as workable and beneficial as the public trustee system. Finally, the arti-
cle discusses constitutional due process defects in the existing statutory
scheme which should be corrected even if a private trustee system is not
adopted.
7. Rocky Mountain News, Nov. 19, 1987, at 90, col. 1; Rocky Mountain News, Sept.
23, 1986, at B6, col. 1-4.
8. H.B. 1197, 56th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess. §§ 1, 7 (Colo. 1987), as originally intro-
duced, available at the Colorado State Archives. The remaining sections of this bill dealt
with various aspects of the foreclosure procedure.
9. H.R.J., 56th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess. 391, 393 (Colo. 1987).
10. Hearings on H.B. 1197 Before the House Comm. on Business Affairs and Labor, 56th Gen.
Ass., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo., March 3, 1987).
11. This article examines and addresses the public trustee system as a whole, not the
capabilities of individual public trustees. Nothing in this article is intended to suggest that
any particular public trustee has performed less than admirably in his or her job. Recom-
mendations are based on changes needed in the system rather than changes in any particu-
lar public trustee's office.
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I. OVERVIEW OF COLORADO'S NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE PROCEDURES
The basic procedures for conducting a nonjudicial foreclosure by
the public trustee are set forth in title 38, articles 37, 38, and 39 of the
Colorado Revised Statutes. 12 The public trustee begins a foreclosure by
recording in the public records the notice of election and demand for
sale stating that the beneficiary has elected to foreclose due to a speci-
fied default. 13 The recording of this document places all persons who
might be interested in the property on constructive notice that foreclo-
sure has commenced. 14 The public trustee then publishes a notice of
sale for five consecutive weeks in a local newspaper.' 5 The notice of sale
states that the property will be sold at a public auction on a given date,
time, and place.' 6 The sale date must be set no less than forty-five and
no more than sixty days after the recording of the notice of election and
demand for sale. 17 The public trustee also mails the published notice of
sale and notice of right to cure and to redeem to the appropriate
parties. 18
Prior to the sale date, the beneficiary must obtain an order from a
court properly having jurisdiction to authorize the sale. 19 The public
trustee cannot sell the property prior to the issuance of such a court
order.
20
At the public sale the trustee sells the property to the highest bidder
who receives a certificate of purchase from the public trustee. 2 1 The
amount of the debt secured by the foreclosed property and the expenses
of the sale are immediately paid from the sale proceeds by either dis-
bursement of funds or cancellation of the debt if the foreclosing benefi-
ciary is the successful bidder.
22
The owner of the property, any person who is potentially liable on a
deficiency, tenants, and junior lienors of record are permitted for a spe-
cific period of time after a valid foreclosure sale to redeem the property
12. For an in-depth discussion of all the steps involved in Colorado's procedure of
foreclosure by public trustee, see BLOOM, PUBLIC TRUSTEE FORECLOSURE IN COLORADO
(Continuing Legal Education in Colorado, Inc. 1985).
13. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-113(1) (Supp. 1987).
14. Id. at § 38-35-109(1) (Supp. 1987); see also Delta County Land & Cattle Co. v.
Talcott, 17 Colo. App. 316, 68 P. 985 (1902).
15. COLO. REV. STATE. at §§ 38-37-118, 24-70-106(2)(d) (1973).
16. Id. at § 38-37-113(1) (Supp. 1987).
17. Id. at § 38-39-117 (1973).
18. Id. at §§ 38-37-113(2), 38-39-102(4), 38-39-118(l)(b) (1973 & Supp. 1987). The
owner of the property being foreclosed or any party liable under the note or deed of trust
is entitled to cure the default when the default is the nonpayment of any sums due under
the note or deed of trust. On or before twelve o'clock noon on the day before the day of
the sale, the curing party must pay to the public trustee all delinquent principal and inter-
est payments exclusive of that portion of principal which would not have been due in the
absence of acceleration. In addition, the curing party is responsible for all costs and ex-
penses related to the proceedings for collection and foreclosure. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-
39-118 (Supp. 1987).
19. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-140 (1973).
20. See infra notes 127-137 and accompanying text.
21. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-37-113, 38-39-115(2) (1973).
22. Id. at § 38-37-113(6) (1973).
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by paying the foreclosure sale price plus certain additional amounts. 23
If redemption is made by the owner of the property, the sale is an-
nulled. 24 The property remains subject to all liens existing before the
sale in the same order of priority, except that the lien of the foreclosed
deed of trust is extinguished by the sale. 2 5 Any redemption by a lienor
is subject to the rights of junior lienors also entitled to redeem. 26 A
junior lienor who fails to redeem loses his lien and any further rights in
the foreclosed property.
2 7
Upon the expiration of all periods of redemption, the public trustee
issues the deed to the property to the holder of the certificate of
purchase, or if the property has been redeemed by a lienor, to the last
redeeming lienor.28 Title to the property from the public trustee is free
and clear of all liens and encumbrances recorded after the foreclosed
deed of trust.
29
II. ORIGINAL PURPOSE OF THE PUBLIC TRUSTEE SYSTEM
Before 1894, deeds of trust in Colorado were granted to private
trustees who were authorized, upon default by the trustor, to advertise
and to sell the real property in strict compliance with the conditions of
the trust.3 0 Although mortgages had to be foreclosed by a sale decreed
by a court of equity,3 1 trust deeds did not.32 While a statutory right of
redemption existed for land sold by court decree,3 3 no right of redemp-
tion was provided when the land was sold pursuant to a deed of trust
unless the parties had otherwise agreed.
3 4
In January 1894, Governor Davis H. Waite convened an extraordi-
nary session of the Colorado General Assembly, one delineated purpose
of which was to "abolish and repeal extraordinary remedies now granted
to creditors in Colorado, which have placed a debtor class wholly within
the power of the creditor, and 'deprived him,' unjustly and against pub-
lic policy, 'of his property, without due process of law.' -35 To accom-
plish this purpose, Governor Waite proposed the enactment of a law
providing that all deeds of trust be declared mortgages with a right of
23. Id. at §§ 38-39-102, 103 (1973 & Supp. 1987). The statutory right of redemption
gives the debtor or owner additional time after the foreclosure sale to refinance and save
the property, allows junior lienors an opportunity to protect their security in the property
and encourages recovery of the highest price for the property. For a discussion of the
policies underlying the statutory redemption rights, see Comment, Statutory Redemption in
Colorado: 1965 Amendments, 39 U. COLO. L. REV. 127 (1966).
24. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-39-105 (Supp. 1987).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at § 38-39-110 (Supp. 1987).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Stephens v. Clay, 17 Colo. 489, 30 P. 43 (1892).
31. CoLo. CODE OF CIv. P. ch. XX, § 234, ch. XXII, § 263 (Dawson 1883); Nevin v.
Lulu & White Silver. Min. Co., 10 Colo. 357, 15 P. 611 (1887).
32. COLO. CODE OF CIv. P. ch. XXII, § 263 (Dawson 1883).
33. MILLS' ANN. STAT. OF COLO. ch. 72, § 2556 (1891).
34. Nippel v. Hammond, 4 Colo. 211 (1878).
35. S.J., 9th Gen. Ass., Extra Sess. 21 (Colo. 1894) (Proclamation of the Governor).
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redemption and subject to foreclosure according to the rules and pro-
ceedings in equity courts. 36 The Governor wanted to protect debtors by
entirely eliminating power of sale foreclosures and by involving courts
in the entire foreclosure process.
Seemingly in response to the Governor's proclamation, House Bill
48 was introduced on January 16, 1894.3 7 This bill, as originally pro-
posed, did not mention the establishment of a public trustee system,
38
nor did it mention the treatment of trust deeds as mortgages. The bill
addressed only the granting of a right of redemption for all mortgage
instruments including trust deeds. 39 The House passed this bill
unanimously.
40
As approved by the House, House Bill 48 did not fare well in the
Senate. The Senate initially recommended that it not pass. 4 1 A special
committee and a committee on revisions then studied the bill. After a
committee of the whole Senate and three conference committees of the
House and Senate made substantial amendments, 42 the General Assem-
bly finally passed an act concerning deeds of trust on March 5, 1894.
4 3
This act created the office of public trustee in every county of the
state and mandated that all deeds of trust given to secure indebtedness
of any kind must name the public trustee as the trustee. 44 The act pro-
vided that any deed of trust that named any other person as trustee
should be deemed to be a mortgage and foreclosed only in and through
the courts in the same manner as mortgages. 4 5 The act provided for the
bonding of public trustees4 6 and prescribed their salaries and fees.4 7 In
addition, the act delineated the procedure for notice of sale and adver-
tisement 48 and provided periods of redemption to the grantor4 9 and
junior creditors.
50
The motivation for the adoption of this unique system for power of
sale foreclosure remains unclear because of the dearth of available legis-
lative history. It has been suggested that the act was designed to elimi-
nate and prevent the widespread abuse of foreclosure by individual
trustees revealed after the drastic collapse of property values during the
36. Id. at 27.
37. Id. at 116.
38. As early as 1889, the office of public trustee was established in counties having a
population of greater than 50,000. 1889 Colo. Sess. Laws 310. The use of a public trustee
was an alternative to a private trustee and appears to have been adopted to provide for an
easy successor to a private trustee who could no longer serve in that capacity.
39. H.B. 48, 9th Gen. Ass., Extra Sess. (Colo. 1894) [hereinafter H.B. 48] (available at
the Colorado State Archives, as originally introduced).
40. S.J., 9th Gen. Ass., Extra Sess. 403 (Colo. 1894).
41. Id. at 193.
42. Id. at 196, 355, 363, 371, 377, 390, 392, 400, 401, 404.
43. Act approved March 5, 1894, ch. 6, 1894 Colo. Sess. Laws 50 (adopting H.B. 48).
44. Id. at § 1.
45. Id.
46. Id. at § 2.
47. Id. at § 3.
48. Id. at §§ 4-5.
49. Id. at § 8.
50. Id. at § 9.
19881
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
depression of the early 1890's. 5 1 Indeed, there was no requirement that
a private trustee be neutral, disinterested, or unrelated to the mortga-
gee,5 2 thus giving rise to potential conflict and temptation for abuse.
53
Elimination of abuses of power by private trustees may have been one
concern of the legislature in 1894, but this concern could have been
remedied by the establishment of controls without the drastic action of
adopting a new governmental bureaucracy of public trustees.
Perhaps the public trustee system was adopted as a compromise be-
tween the existing method of foreclosure by private trustees, which did
not involve the courts or any public entity, and Governor Waite's pro-
posed requirement that the courts supervise all foreclosures. The use of
public rather than private trustees gave control of the foreclosure pro-
cess to a public official without eliminating the ease and cost effective-
ness of power of sale foreclosures. This involvement of a public official
provided at least a semblance of protection for the debtor, as Governor
Waite clearly desired, by constraining creditors and their chosen private
trustees from taking unfair advantage of an otherwise totally un-
supervised foreclosure process.
Since the implementation of the public trustee system, a mandatory
court proceeding to obtain an order authorizing the sale has been added
to Colorado's foreclosure process. 5 4 Further, an interested party has the
right to seek injunctive relief before the foreclosure sale regardless of
the grant or denial of an order authorizing the sale.5 5 Under certain
circumstances, the court may retain supervisory jurisdiction over the en-
tire foreclosure process. 56 These judicial proceedings amply protect the
debtor and control the mortgagee. With the addition of court involve-
ment in the power of sale foreclosure process, the public trustee system
51. Storke & Sears, Enforcement of Security Interests in Colorado, 25 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 1,
20 (1952); see also Lindsay, Foreclosure by the Public Trustee, 9 DICTA 6 (1931).
52. See, e.g., Hamill v. Copeland, 26 Colo. 178, 56 P. 901 (1899) (an officer of a corpo-
ration may act as the trustee in a trust deed in which the corporation is the beneficiary);
Wells v. Caywood, 3 Colo. 487 (1877) (the husband of the beneficiary can serve as the
trustee).
53. No cases were found dealing with the abuse of trust power prior to 1894, but the
existence of cases which reached appellate review a few years later suggests that such
events could have occurred when the public trustee system was adopted in 1894. See Bent-
Otero Imp. Co. v. Whitehead, 25 Colo. 354, 54 P. 1023 (1898) (wrongful sale and misap-
plication of sale proceeds); Appelman v. Gara, 22 Colo. 397, 45 P. 366 (1896) (wrongful
release of deed of trust).
54. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-140 (1973) provides that the beneficiary of the deed of
trust being foreclosed must obtain an order authorizing the sale from a court properly
having jurisdiction. COLO. R. Civ. P. 120 sets forth the procedures for obtaining this
order.
55. COLO. R. Civ. P. 120(d) (the granting of the motion under Rule 120 is without
prejudice to the right of any aggrieved person to seek injunctive relief, and the denial of
the motion is without prejudice to any right or remedy of the movant); Boulder Lumber
Co. v. Alpine of Nederland, 626 P.2d 724 (Colo. App. 1981) (injunction against public
trustee's sale was proper when priority of liens was in dispute).
56. Bakers Park Mining & Milling Co. v. Dist. Ct., 662 P.2d 483 (Colo. 1983) (Rule
120 does not preclude the court from retaining supervisory jurisdiction over the foreclo-
sure to assure that due process is afforded to the parties).
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is no longer necessary to serve the original purpose for which it was
adopted.
III. IMPROVEMENTS FROM COMPETITION
The power to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure rests exclusively in
one person in each county, the public trustee. The elimination of this
monopoly of services and the encouragement of competition among
many private parties will improve the quality of performance of trustee
services. 57 The ones who provide a timely, efficient, and cost effective
service will thrive while the others will fail. No such incentive for im-
provement among public trustees currently exists.
A non-competitive government bureaucracy is hindered in provid-
ing timely services because it cannot quickly and efficiently adjust to the
demands created by fluctuations in the economy. For example, the dra-
matic rise in the number of foreclosures in 1986, as compared to the
year before, resulted in a huge backlog of unfiled foreclosures and thus
prompted the public trustee for the City and County of Denver to cut
back on the office's public hours to give employees time to work on this
backlog. 58 Likewise, the deputy public trustee of El Paso County ac-
knowledged that her office was unable to file the foreclosure notices as
fast as they came in. 59 It is common knowledge in the real estate com-
munity that, in 1986, none of the metropolitan county public trustees
could meet the statutory time requirements for the recording of the
commencement of foreclosure proceedings.
60
Although it is certainly possible for private trustees to become
overburdened as well, the total foreclosures that can be efficiently han-
dled will increase if the number of people who offer the service in-
creases. Further, private industry can usually reallocate resources to
accommodate increased demand for a particular service more easily
than the public sector. If trustees can be substituted, one private trustee
who reaches capacity could use another trustee to perform additional
foreclosures. Finally, private trustees are motivated to take the steps
necessary to do a timely job because their failure to do so will result in a
57. It is assumed that competition in the open market, a touchstone of a free enter-
prise economic system, is favored over a monopoly and should be promoted whenever
possible and appropriate. Indeed, the promotion of competition is the basic objective of
the antitrust laws. Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the
Antitrust Laws 1 (March 31, 1955). Supporters of the similar concept of "privatization"
(the public sector contracts for the performance of public services by private industry)
assert that private businesses generally perform the services more efficiently and that com-
petition has reduced the cost to the government. Main, When Public Services Go Private,
FORTUNE, May 27, 1985, at 92. But see McEntee, City Services: Can Free Enterprise Outperform
the Public Sector?, 55 Bus. So. REV. 43 (1985).
58. Rocky Mountain News, Sept. 23, 1986, at B6, col. 1. As of September 1986, the
number of foreclosures in Denver was 18.1% higher than for a comparable period in 1985.
Id.
59. Id. at col. 4.
60. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-113(1) (Supp. 1987) provides that the public trustee
shall record a copy of the notice of election and demand for sale in the office of the county
clerk and recorder within seven working days following its receipt.
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mortgagee taking its business elsewhere. All of these motivational fac-
tors and abilities for resource allocation should enhance the timeliness
of performance by trustees. Few such factors operate within the public
trustee system.
6 '
Price competition among private trustees seeking business could re-
sult in lower fees than those currently charged by public trustees
62
which would benefit the financially troubled debtor.63 Presently, there
is not and cannot be competition among public trustees to encourage
lower fees, nor can the mandatory fees established for public trustees be
adjusted to coincide accurately with the revenue needs of their particu-
lar offices. 64 The statutory fee schedule should be modified to establish
maximum fees that can be- charged for trustee services rather than
mandatory amounts. 6 5 With this flexibility, private trustees could
charge less than the statutory fee amount if the operation of a competi-
tive, cost-efficient business justified such charges.
IV. ADVANTAGES OF PUBLIC TRUSTEE SYSTEM RETAINED BY THE
PRIVATE TRUSTEE SYSTEM
Public trustees act impartially to protect both the debtor and the
beneficiary. They provide a central repository for foreclosure docu-
ments in each county, and are also less likely than private trustees to
abuse their power. These perceived advantages of a public official's in-
volvement in the foreclosure process are either non-existent or can be
equally available from a private trustee with minor statutory
modifications.
A. Impartiality
Arguably, the public trustee acts as an impartial party to protect all
61. A new provision requiring the public trustee to forfeit five percent of his fees for
each day the public trustee fails to meet the statutory time requirements was recently en-
acted. Id. at § 38-37-143 (Supp. 1987). It remains to be seen whether the threat of this
penalty will result in more timely performance by the public trustees.
62. The mandatory fees that a public trustee must charge for the different services
performed are fixed by statute. Id. at § 38-37-105(l)(b) (Supp. 1987) (if the original prin-
cipal indebtedness secured by the deed of trust being foreclosed does not exceed
$240,000, then the public trustee fee is $75; where such amount exceeds $240,000, the fee
is 1/32 of 1% of the original principal indebtedness, but in no case less than $75).
63. All public trustee fees, charges, and costs are charged against the grantor of the
deed of trust or those holding under him, and are deducted from the proceeds of the
foreclosure sale. Id. at § 38-37-119 (1973).
64. In at least one county the mandatory fees appear to be excessive. In El Paso
County, the fees collected in 1986 for all public trustee services exceeded expenses, not
including office rent, by $272,597.99. This information was obtained from an internal
accounting sheet provided by the public trustee's office in El Paso County.
65. Although this suggested price control may be considered anti-competitive, it is
necessary to protect the debtor from any potential increase in the cost of foreclosure by a
private trustee, one of the major concerns of the opponents of private trustees. California
has enacted such fee limitations. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2924c(d), 2924d(a) (West Supp.
1987). Other costs of foreclosure, such as attorneys' fees, may decrease if a private trustee
expands the services it provides for the maximum statutory fee to include services like
document preparation, which are currently performed by the attorney for the beneficiary.
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parties, especially the debtor, and his involvement assures a degree of
fairness in the proceedings. 66 A public trustee, however, provides no
greater neutrality or fairness than a private trustee while performing
under the same statutory scheme. The acts of the public trustee are not
discretionary. 6 7 The procedures that must be followed are prescribed in
detail by statute and the deed of trust.
68
Although the public trustee administers the foreclosure, the mort-
gagee prepares all of the documents and provides all of the necessary
information, including the list of all notice recipients. 69 The public
trustee has no liability for any errors or omissions in the names and ad-
dresses stated on this mailing list.70 Further, the public trustee has no
responsibility for determining the amount or reasonableness of a bid,
the costs and expenses allowable in computing the debt, or the amount
necessary for cure or redemption. 7 1 Although the public trustee may
give a stronger appearance of impartiality and fairness because he is a
public official, a private trustee, like the public trustee, could be bound
to act only in accordance with statutes and the deed of trust, and would
owe a duty of fairness and good faith to all parties involved. 7 2 Further-
more, the retention of the requirement for a court order authorizing the
sale, regardless of whether a public or private trustee administers the
foreclosure proceedings, assures a degree of fairness to all parties.
B. Document Repository
Another perceived advantage of the public trustee system is that
each public trustee's office provides one central repository in each
county for all documents relating to each foreclosure conducted in that
county. 73 Admittedly, a central location for documents simplifies review
of the foreclosure proceedings for title and other purposes, and, under
the present statutory scheme, this advantage would be lost if many pri-
vate trustees were allowed to conduct nonjudicial foreclosures under a
power of sale. The public land records, however, easily could serve as
an effective substitute to the public trustee's office for the central loca-
tion of all pertinent documents. Currently, the only documents regard-
ing the foreclosure that are filed of record with the county clerk and
recorder are: the notice of election and demand for sale (declaring a
default under the deed of trust and the mortgagee's election to advertise
66. Hearings on H. B. 1197 Before the House Comm. on Business Affairs and Labor, 56th Gen.
Ass., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo., March 3, 1987) (testimony of Esther Rinard and Felicia Muftic).
67. The courts generally do not evaluate a trustee's performance based on whether he
abused his discretion. Rather, the courts determine whether the trustee was correct in
applying the statutory mandates. See, e.g., Johnson v. Smith, 675 P.2d 307 (Colo. 1984);
Dolan v. Flett, 582 P.2d 694 (Colo. App. 1978).
68. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-37-105(1), 38-37-113 (1973 and Supp. 1987).
69. Id. at § 38-37-113(l), (9) (Supp. 1987).
70. Id. at § 38-37-113(9) (Supp. 1987).
71. Id. at § 38-37-105(4) (Supp. 1987).
72. J. H. Morris, Inc. v. Indian Hills, 282 Ala. 443, 212 So. 2d 831 (1968); Union
Market Nat'l Bank v. Derderian, 62 N.E.2d 661 (Mass. 1945).
73. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-113(1),(4) (1973 and Supp. 1987).
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the property for sale),74 the certificate of purchase (identifying the pur-
chaser at the sale and the amount paid at the sale for the property),
7 5
the certificate of redemption (containing the name of the person re-
deeming and the amount paid by him)76 and the public trustee's deed.
7 7
Additionally, the recording of one or more affidavits of the trustee stat-
ing the names and addresses to whom all notices were sent, the manner
of publication of the notice of sale, the manner of disbursement of sale
proceeds, and a certified copy of the court order authorizing the sale
should be required. With the recordation of all of these documents, an
interested party would have easy access to the pertinent documents to
determine whether any foreclosure was conducted in accordance with
the statutory procedures.
78
Finally, the inclusion of the private trustee's name, address, and
phone number on the notice of election and demand for sale should
inform junior lienors of where to file their notices of intent to redeem,
and mortgagors of where to tender cure payments. This information
would also be available for anyone interested in knowing the location of
the entire foreclosure file.
C. Abuse of Power
Certainly both public and private trustees will make mistakes. 79 No
sure method exists to totally prevent errors or fraudulent conduct by
either public or private trustees. Some limitation on who can act as a
private trustee, however, will bolster the quality of service and discour-
age abuses by private trustees in the first instance. Some states have
provided that the only ones who can act as private trustees are mem-
bers of the state bar,80 banks, savings and loan associations, 8 1 corpora-
tions authorized to do trust business in the state, 82 title insurance
companies, 8 3 licensed real estate brokers, 84 and licensed insurance
74. Id. § 38-37-113(1) (Supp. 1987).
75. Id. § 38-39-115(2) (1973).
76. Id. §§ 38-39-104 to 105 (Supp. 1987).
77. Id. § 38-39-110 (Supp. 1987).
78. For examples of statutes requiring the recordation of certain documents regard-
ing foreclosure, see ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.080(d) (1985) (affidavit of mailing notice of de-
fault and of publication of notice of sale); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-808(A)(3) (Supp.
1986) (notice of sale); IDAHO CODE § 45-1506(7) (Supp. 1987) (affidavit of mailing notice
of sale and of posting and publication of notice of sale); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW
§§ 1421, 1423 (McKinney 1979) (affidavits of sale, publication of notice of sale, and ser-
vice of copy of notice).
79. See, e.g., Johnson v. Smith, 675 P.2d 307 (Colo. 1984) (public trustee gave incor-
rect information to a junior lienor regarding the applicable redemption period); Stephens
v. Clay, 17 Colo. 489, 30 P. 43 (1892) (private trustee provided only 89 days notice instead
of 90 days notice required by the applicable trust deed).
80. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-803(A)(2) (Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE § 45-1504(1)(a)
(Supp. 1987).
81. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-803(A)(5) (Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE § 45-1504(l)(b)
(Supp. 1987).
82. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-803(A)(1) (Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE § 45-1504(l)(c)
(Supp. 1987).
83. IDAHO CODE § 45-1504(1)(d) (Supp. 1987).
84. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-803(A)(3) (Supp. 1986).
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agents. 8 5 In addition, prohibiting anyone who is related or affiliated
with the mortgagee from acting as the trustee can reduce the potential
for fraud and abuse of the trust power.
86
Liberal provisions for the appointment of a successor or substitute
trustee if the original trustee is unwilling, unable, or unqualified to serve
or resigns, as well as in the event the mortgagee simply wants to remove
the trustee for failure to perform, are needed to assure the efficient op-
eration of a private trustee system. These provisions should include the
giving of notice of the substituted or successor trustee to both the origi-
nal trustee and the grantor of the deed of trust. Additionally, these pro-
visions should provide for the recording of the substituted or successor
trustee's name and address in the public records.
8 7
V. RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO REMEDY CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECTS
Unlike the nonjudicial foreclosure procedures used by jurisdictions
recognizing a power of sale in a private trustee with no court authority
for the sale, 8 8 a system in Colorado of nonjudicial foreclosure by private
trustees that retains a court's involvement8 9 constitutes direct participa-
tion by the state in the foreclosure procedures. 90 Consequently, the
85. Id. at § 33-803(A)(4).
86. Before entering office, every public trustee must execute a bond from a responsi-
ble surety company in the amount of $25,000, $10,000, or $5,000, depending upon the
class of the county. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-102 (1973). Private trustees should also be
required to be bonded, albeit in a larger amount. This might not actually prevent fraud
and abuse of the trust power but would provide a remedy for parties injured by such acts.
87. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-804 (Supp. 1986); CAL. CIv. CODE § 2934a
(West Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE § 45-1504(2) (Supp. 1987).
88. A majority of courts have held that a power of sale to a private trustee is derived
from a private contractual agreement and therefore state action is not involved. See Levine
v. Stein, 560 F.2d 1175 (4th Cir. 1977); Northrip v. Federal Nat'l. Mtg. Ass'n, 527 F.2d 23
(6th Cir. 1975); Barrera v. Security Bldg. & Investment Corp., 519 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir.
1975); Bryant v. Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 166 U.S. App. D. C. 178, 509 F.2d 511
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Garfinkle v. Superior Court, 146 Cal. Rptr. 208, 578 P.2d 925 (1978);
Coffey Enterprises Realty & Devel. Co. v. Holmes, 233 Ga. 937, 213 S.E.2d 882 (1975);
Federal Nat'l. Mfg. Ass'n v. Howlett, 521 S.W.2d 428 (Mo. 1975); Armenta v. Nussbaum,
519 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Kennebec, Inc. v. Bank of the West, 88 Wash.2d
718, 565 P.2d 812 (1977).
89. The major premise of this article is that the court's involvement will be retained as
an integral part of the power of sale foreclosure process by a private trustee. It should be
noted that if the private trustee is allowed to conduct the foreclosure proceedings and the
requirement for a court order authorizing the sale is eliminated, no state action would be
present and the fourteenth amendment would give no protection regardless of how dis-
criminating or unfair the private conduct may be. See supra, note 88 and cases cited
therein.
90. See, e.g., Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975) (statutory pro-
cedure for foreclosure and sale under which the clerk of the court audits the trustee's
report of the sale involves state action for due process purposes). In the following cases,
the involvement by public officials was not enough to constitute state action: Kenly v.
Miracle Properties, 412 F. Supp. 1072 (D. Ariz. 1976) (court clerk records the deed and
receives excess funds); Global Industries, Inc., v. Harris, 376 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Ga.
1974) (clerk of the court performs the ministerial action of recording the deed); Garfinkle
v. Superior Court, 146 Cal. Rptr. 208, 578 P.2d 925 (1978) (county recorder ascertains
that documents relating to the property contain the information required by law and the
court enforces the agreement of the parties made with respect to the nonjudicial foreclo-
sure procedures or enforces the purchaser's right to possession after the sale).
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procedures afforded in the process must comply with the due process
constraints of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion.9 ' Although the current statutory scheme meets the due process
requirements of notice and hearing, the existing statutes fail to meet the
constitutional guidelines regarding the manner in which notice is given.
This constitutional deficiency in the statutory foreclosure procedures
should be remedied as part of establishing a private trustee system to
assure that the private trustee system is fair and comports with due pro-
cess from the outset.
92
A. Notice
The Colorado statutory foreclosure scheme adequately provides for
the notice required. 93 Notice by publication alone cannot be relied on
for notice to interested parties whose names and addresses are known
from the public records.9 4 Notice by mail of the foreclosure sale 95 and
of the hearing 96 to all persons shown by the public records to have an
interest in the property is required. 9 7 This satisfies at least one aspect of
the notice requirements for procedural due process under the four-
teenth amendment. 9 8
The manner in which these notices are given is suspect under due
process requirements. The foreclosing party must send the published
notice of sale, the notice of redemptive and cure rights,9 9 and the notice
of the hearing only to the address given in the recorded instrument
demonstrating such person's interest in the real estate.1 0 0 The foreclos-
91. As a factual predicate to any claim under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, a significant degree of state involvement must be established. See Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Reitman v. Malkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
92. Even if the public trustee system is retained, the suggested modifications to rem-
edy constitutional defects should be enacted. The same constitutional deficiencies in the
existing foreclosure procedure are present whether a public or private trustee is involved.
93. Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983) (notice by publica-
tion is not reasonably calculated to inform interested parties who can be notified by more
effective means such as personal service or mailed notice); Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (prior to an action that will affect an interest in life,
liberty, or property protected by the Due Process Clause, a state must provide notice rea-
sonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pen-
dency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections).
94. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-113(2) (1973); COLO. R. Civ. P. 120(b).
95. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-113(2) (1973).
96. COLO. R. Civ. P. 120(b).
97. Id. at 120(a)-(b); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-113(2) (1973).
98. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
99. From 1975 to 1977, Colorado statutes required that the notices of rights to cure
and redeem be mailed to the grantor of the deed of trust and the owner of the premises, at
their last known addresses. See Act effectiveJuly 1, 1975, ch. 333, § 1-2, 1975 Colo. Sess.
Laws 1442, 1443 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-39-102, 118 (1976)). In
response to testimony alleging that the system was creating chaos because it required ex-
amining every telephone book and city directory to determine addresses, (Hearings on S.B.
375 Before the Colorado Senate Comm. on Business Affairs and Labor, 51st Gen. Ass., 1st Reg.
Sess. (March 15, 1977) (testimony of William Horlbeck)), the statute was amended to re-
quire notice to be sent only to the address given in the public record. COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 38-39-102(5), 38-39-118(i)(b) (1973 & Supp. 1987).
100. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-37-113(2), 38-39-118(l)(b), 38-39-102(5) (1973 & Supp.
1987); COLO. R. Civ. P. 120(a)-(b).
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ing party only needs to mail the required notices to the county seat
where the county and state are the only address given for any named
person.' 0 ' If the recorded instrument does not give an address, it is not
necessary to mail any notice to that particular person. 10 2 The one ex-
ception to this general rule is that the grantor of the deed of trust, the
current record owner of the property to be sold, and persons known or
believed by the movant to be personally liable upon the indebtedness
secured by the deed of trust, must be given notice of the hearing sent to
their last known address as shown by the movant's records.
0 3
In summary, there is no requirement for foreclosing parties to give
anyone, not even the record owner of the property or the grantor of the
deed of trust, notice of the sale at an address other than the address
given of record. Parties with interests in the property have no right to
any notice if their addresses are not of record. Only a limited few must
be given notice of the hearing at their last known address. Junior lienors
whose rights will be extinguished by the foreclosure sale if they fail to
redeem have no right to receive notice at an address other than the ad-
dress given of record. ' 0 4 Colorado's statutory scheme thus fails to pro-
vide for actual notice to a party whose property interest may be
adversely affected even when the foreclosing party knows or can ascer-
tain such party's name and address with relative ease.
In Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 105 the United States
Supreme Court, purportedly following the Court's previous analysis in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 106 and a long line of cases
thereafter, 10 7 found that the manner of notice of a tax sale provided to a
mortgagee under Indiana law was unconstitutional. The challenged no-
tice provision permitted notice by posting and publishing an announce-
ment of the tax sale and by mailing a notice to the mortgagor by
certified mail. The Court recognized that a mortgagee possesses a sub-
stantial, legally protected property interest that is significantly affected
by a tax sale under Indiana law, 10 8 thereby entitling the mortgagee to
notice reasonably calculated to apprise him of a pending tax sale.' 0 9 In
101. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-37-113(3) (1973); COLO. R. Civ. P. 120(a).
102. COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-37-113(3) (1973); COLO. R. Civ. P. 120(a).
103. CoLo. R. Civ. P. 120(a).
104. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-39-105, 38-39-110 (1973 & Supp. 1987).
105. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
106. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
107. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982); Schroeder v. New York City, 371 U.S.
208 (1962); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
108. At the time of the case, Indiana law provided for the annual sale of real property
for property tax payments which were delinquent for 15 months or longer. Prior to the
sale, the county auditor had to post and publish notice of the sale. The owner of the
property was entitled to receive notice by certified mail at his last known address, but
mortgagees were not entitled to such notice. After the required notice was provided, the
county treasurer held a public auction. The tax sale was followed by a two year redemp-
tion period for the owner, occupant, lienholder, or any other person who had an interest
in the property. Since no one redeemed the property during the statutory redemption
period, the purchaser at the sale was entitled to a deed for the property free and clear of all
liens and encumbrances on the property.
109. Adanms, 462 U.S. at 798.
1988]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
Adams, the Court rejected the argument that constructive notice to the
mortgagee was sufficient since the public records identified the mortga-
gee. 1 to The Court stated: "When the mortgagee is identified in a mort-
gage that is publicly recorded, constructive notice by publication must
be supplemented by notice mailed to the mortgagee's last known avail-
able address, or by personal service.""' In making its decision, the
Court in Adams assumed that the foreclosing party could have discov-
ered the mortgagee's address through reasonable diligence.t12 The
Court acknowledged, however, that a governmental body should not be
required to undertake extraordinary efforts to discover the identity and
whereabouts of a mortgagee whose identity is not in the public
record.' 13
In view of Adams, a constitutional due process challenge may prevail
as to two aspects of the existing Colorado foreclosure statutes.' 14 First,
notice of the sale and hearing are not required if the recorded instru-
ment contains no address for the interested party even though that party
is identified in the public records.' 15 Further, a foreclosing party is not
required to make any effort other than a review of the public land
records to determine an address for a notice recipient. This is true even
if sending notice to the address given in the recorded instrument is un-
likely to provide actual notice. 1 16
To meet the constitutional guidelines stated in Adams, Colorado
should amend its notice requirements to provide for notice of the sale
and hearing to be sent to the address of all persons otherwise entitled to
receive notice (i) as stated in the recorded instruments; (ii) as set forth in
any subsequently recorded document specifically changing the address;
and (iii) to the last known address as shown by the mortgagee's own
records. These requirements will increase the likelihood of the receipt
of notice by those entitled to it without imposing an unreasonable duty
on the mortgagees to undertake efforts to discover their whereabouts.
The ruling in Adams may indicate that a governmental body is required
only to search the public records to determine the "last known available
address" of interested parties.' 7 Yet, under Colorado's statutory
scheme, the governmental body is not responsible for determining who
110. Id.
11. Id.
112. Id. at 798 n.4.
113. Id.
114. A challenge under the due process clause of the COLO. CONST. art. II, § 25, would
also prevail since the Colorado Constitution requires, at a minimum, the same due process
guarantees as the U.S. Constitution. City and County of Denver v. Eggert, 647 P.2d. 216, 224
(Colo. 1982).
115. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-113(3) (1973); COLO. R. Civ. P. 120(a).
116. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-113(3) (1973); COLO. R. Civ. P. 120(a).
117. At least one court has suggested that a reasonably ascertainable address is one
given in the public land records. Benoit v. Panthaky, 780 F.2d 336, 338 (3d Cir. 1985).
Another court was satisfied that due process had been given by the mailing of notice to the
last known address of the owner of the real estate as it appeared on the records of the
treasurer. Bender v. City of Rochester, N.Y., 765 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1985). In both cases the
governmental body itself was deciding to whom and where notices were to be sent.
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should receive notice and where such notice is sent." 8 The mortgagee
makes these decisions, 19 and neither the trustee nor the court has re-
sponsibility for the accuracy of the decisions. 120 Under these circum-
stances, a reasonably diligent effort to ascertain a correct address for the
notice recipient as required by the Court in Adams 12' should include, at
a minimum, a review of the mortgagee's own records.
B. Hearing
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that a fun-
damental requirement of due process is to afford an individual the op-
portunity to be heard at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner
before he is finally deprived of a property interest. 12 2 The formality,
procedural requisites, and timing for the hearing vary depending on the
nature of the interest involved and the nature of the subsequent
proceedings. '
2 3
Prior to 1977, the Colorado statutory foreclosure scheme had no
provision requiring a hearing of any type, either before or after the pub-
lic trustee's sale of the property. 124 In 1977, the Colorado legislature
enacted a law 125 which assures the mortgagor of at least one opportu-
nity to be heard before the foreclosure sale.
12 6
118. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-113(1) (Supp. 1987); COLO. R. Civ. P. 120(a).
119. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-113(1) (Supp. 1987); COLO. R. Civ. P. 120(a).
120. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-37-113(9) (Supp. 1987); COLO. R. Civ. P. 120(b).
121. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. at 798 (1983); see also Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950).
122. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Mitchell v. W. T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972); Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970); Snia-
dach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
123. See Fuentes, 407 U.S. 67; Boddie, 401 U.S. 371; Mullane, 339 U.S. 306.
124. In 1975, the Colorado Supreme Court in Princeville Corp. v. Brooks, 188 Colo.
37, 533 P.2d 916 (1975), first recognized the trend of restricting ex parte taking of property
without a hearing in order to conform to the due process requirements of the fourteenth
amendment. In analyzing this concern, the court found that the procedure for a hearing as
provided under CoLo. R. Civ. P. 120, although arguably given only to persons in the mili-
tary, could be broadly interpreted. Under Rule 120, the court could consider factors other
than military status to determine if it could justifiably retain supervisory jurisdiction over
the foreclosure and sale. The court recognized that this was the only opportunity available
for defining factors existing in the foreclosure proceeding. No mention was made whether
anything in the state statutory procedure required the mortgagee to obtain the court order
authorizing the sale. Subsequently, Rule 120 was repealed, amended, and re-enacted, ef-
fective October 1, 1976, "to provide for due process safeguards to one who challenges the
entitlement to foreclose a deed of trust containing a power of sale to the public trustee."
Valley Dev. at Vail v. Warder, 192 Colo. 316, 318, 557 P.2d 1180, 1182 (1976).
125. Act effectiveJuly 1, 1977, ch. 492, § 6, 1977 Colo. Sess. Laws 1723, 1726 (codified
as amended at CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-37-140 (1973 & Supp. 1987)) (requiring a court
order authorizing the sale).
126. See Nelson, Constitutional Problems with Power of Sale Real Estate Foreclosure: A Judicial
Dilemma, 43 Mo. L. REV. 25, 32 (1978) (the author concludes that some type of hearing
before the foreclosure sale is probably required by the procedural due process clause); see
also, Hearings on S.B. 375 Before the Senate Comm. on Business Affairs and Labor, 51st Gen. Ass.,
Ist Reg. Sess. (Colo., Mar. 15, 1977) (testimony of William Horlbeck). But see Union Bank
Co. v. Brumbaugh, 69 Ohio St. 2d 202, 206, 431 N.E.2d 1020, 1024 (1982) (relying on
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Ohio Supreme Court determined that due
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Rule 120 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the
procedure used to obtain the order authorizing the sale. This rule allows
any interested person seeking such order to file a verified motion with
the district court. A response opposing the motion is also provided
for.
1 2 7 The rule allows an opportunity for a hearing, 128 although the
court may dispense with it if no response is filed and the court is satisfied
that the movant is entitled to the order authorizing the sale.' 29 The rule
limits the scope of the hearing to a determination of whether there is a
reasonable probability of the existence of a default or other circum-
stances justifying the exercise of the power of sale under the terms of
the deed of trust.' 30 The hearing may also include consideration of is-
sues required by the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940.13'
Many issues that could vitally affect the rights of the debtor, the
owner of the property, and junior lienors and their ability to cure or to
redeem, cannot be considered in the Rule 120 court hearing. 132 These
types of issues can appropriately be raised and considered in independ-
ent actions for declaratory relief 13 3 or injunctive relief 134 regardless of
the outcome of the motion for an order authorizing the sale. ' 35 In addi-
tion, the court may retain supervisory jurisdiction over the proposed
foreclosure if circumstances warrant such continued supervision.
13 6
These proceedings which provide interested persons the opportunity to
be heard can occur prior to the foreclosure sale but no later than before
the owner or any lienor is finally deprived of his property interest.
13 7
Thus, Colorado's statutory foreclosure scheme, combined with the pro-
cedures allowed by the Colorado courts, meets the due process require-
ments of an opportunity for a hearing prior to the deprivation of a
significant property interest.1
3 8
process does not require that one must be afforded a hearing prior to a court determina-
tion that the foreclosure sale was conducted in conformity with the statutory requisites).
127. COLO. R. Civ. P. 120(a)-(c).
128. Id. at 120(d).
129. Id. at 120(e).
130. Id. at 120(d).
131. Id.
132. These include the reasonableness of foreclosure costs, whether or not the proce-
dures followed were defective, and the priority of liens. See, e.g., Bakers Park Mining &
Milling Co. v. Dist. Ct., 662 P.2d 483, 485 (Colo. 1983) (consideration of attorneys' fees
charged beyond scope of Rule 120 hearing); Boulder Lumber Co. v. Alpine of Nederland,
626 P.2d 724, 725 (Colo. App. 1981) (priority of mechanics' liens is beyond scope of Rule
120 hearing).
133. Bakers Park, 662 P.2d at 483.
134. Id. at 485; see also Boulder Lumber, 626 P.2d at 725.
135. COLO. R. Civ. P. 120(d).
136. Bakers Park, 662 P.2d at 483; Princeville Corp. v. Brooks, 188 Colo. 37, 533 P.2d 916
(1975).
137. In Colorado, the owner's and lienor's rights in the property are not terminated
until the expiration of all redemption periods. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-39-110 (Supp.
1987).
138. At least two courts have stated that the right to bring a suit for injunctive relief
alone is not enough to satisfy due process. However, the right to bring a suit for injunctive
relief combined with a requirement for the mortgagee to bear the burden of proving the
probable validity of his claim and allowing the mortgagor the opportunity to rebut and




The public trustee system has outlived its original purpose. Only a
few changes to Colorado's foreclosure scheme are needed to take ad-
vantage of the potential improvements to the power of sale foreclosure
process that competition among private trustees will bring. The Colo-
rado legislature should enact requirements regarding the recording of
several additional documents, the substitution of trustees, and limita-
tions on who can act as a private trustee. The lack of procedural due
process in the manner of notice provisions currently in force should be
corrected. With these changes, the private trustee, like the public
trustee, will be compelled to act in accordance with the existing statutes
and deed of trust. The changes this article proposes would thus create a
more responsive and efficient foreclosure process while continuing to
protect the rights of debtors and others in the property being
foreclosed.
ing. See Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250, 1261 (W.D.N.C. 1975): Garner v. Tri-
State Dev. Co., 382 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
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